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In sexual assault cases, the ability to distinguish myths and stereotypes from 
legitimate
 lines of reasoning continues to be a challenge for Canadian courts. The 
author argues that this challenge could be overcome by clearly identj5iingproblematic 
inferences in sexual assault cases as prohibited lines of reasoning, while allowing the 
defence to bring forward evidence that is logically relevant to the material issues so 
long as it does not raise these prohibited inferences. 
This paper advances that judges should take a broad view of relevance as an 
evidentiary approach in the adjudication of sexual assault cases. This approach 
allows for a consideration of circumstances surrounding the alleged assault, which 
may include an analysis ofthe nature ofthe interactions between the accused and the 
complainant leading up to the alleged assault and in its aftermath. This approach 
is necessary in order for the accused to make full answer and defence. However, 
common myths and stereotypes about sexual assault are prohi bited grounds that the 
law has rightly removedfrom legal consideration. The author discusses a number of 
these myths, with a special focus on the "twin myths' which the law has rejected: 
that the complainant is more likely to have consented, or is less worthy of belief, 
given prior sexual activity. Lastly, the author turns to the evidence ofthe perpetrator 
and the complainant's relationship subsequent to the alleged assault—where 
provincial courts have split in determining what is or is not a prohibited inference 
when examining this subsequent relationship. 
This paper ultimately argues that the current challenge facing Canadian courts 
is ensuring that judges and juries avoid these prohibited lines of reasoning, while 
retaining broad access to information about the circumstances and the ability to 
draw reasonable, context-specific inferences. Doing so would bring clarity to this 
important area of evidence law. 
'Osgoode Hall Law School, York University I am grateful to Professors Benjamin Berger, 
Richard Haigh, Lisa Kelly and Don Stuart, and to the anonymous peer reviewers, for their 
insightful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Michael Ferguson and 
Samiyyah Ganga for their excellent research assistance and the editors of the Queen's Law 
Journal for their careful work. 
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Some of the most difficult problems in the law on sexual assault are 
evidentiary.1  In deciding disputed factual issues in sexual assault cases, challenging 
questions persist about what types of evidence are relevant and what inferences 
can be drawn from that evidence. For example, what, if anything, can be made 
of evidence that the complainant communicated to the accused an intention to 
engage in sex with the accused hours before the alleged sexual assault?' What, 
if anything, can be made of evidence that the complainant continued to have 
an affectionate or sexual relationship with the accused after the alleged sexual 
assault?' 'These questions turn on our understanding of relevance. They are also 
complicated by the fact that, as L'Heureux-Dubé J recognized almost three 
decades ago, sexual assault is an area where common sense judgments about 
relevance are frequently infused with stereotypes and myths.4 
Canadian law is properly committed to eliminating myths and stereotypes 
from the adjudication of sexual assault cases. Rape shield provisions prohibit use 
of evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant to raise the discriminatory 
inferences that the complainant is less credible or more likely to consent by 
1. See generally Susan Estrich, "Teaching Rape Law" (1992) 102:2 Yale LJ 509 (stating that 
"society's continued ambivalence towards acquaintance rape is increasingly being expressed in 
evidentiary rules and standards of credibility rather than in the definitions of force and consent" 
at 519-20). 
2. See e.g. R v Ururyar, 2017 ONSC 4428 [UruryarONSC]. 
3. See e.g. R v Ghomeshi, 2016 ONCJ 155. 
4. See R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme, [1991] 2 SCR 577 at 679, 83 DLR (4th) 193, EHeureux-
Dubé J, dissenting in part [Seaboyer]. 
virtue of her sexual experience.' Other stereotypical inferences have been 
prohibited in the case law, such as the inferences that a woman who dresses in a 
provocative manner invites sexual assault,' and that a lack of resistance amounts 
to consent.7  The law's aspiration to eliminate these discriminatory forms of 
reasoning remains, of course, imperfectly realized. Scholars have documented 
the persistence of myths and stereotypes about sexual assault, demonstrating 
that lawyers and judges continue to rely on them with troubling regularity.' 
Undoubtedly, more work must be done to remove the influence of stereotypical 
reasoning in sexual assault cases. 
At the same time, the category of myths and stereotypes is controversial. 
Some warn that excessive expansion of this category could threaten the fair 
trial rights of the accused by unjustifiably limiting the inferences that may be 
drawn from relevant evidence.' Professor Don Stuart put it this way: "[N] or all 
assertions of myths and stereotypes are beyond critical scrutiny and fair trial 
considerations ....When a judge asserts that something is a myth or false 
stereotype, the factual inquiry into relevance is pre-empted and turned into an 
indisputable question of law."" On this view, care must be taken to ensure that 
efforts to eliminate myths and stereotypes do not result in the inappropriate 
rejection of relevant evidence. 
This paper takes seriously both the need to remove myths and stereotypes 
from the adjudication of sexual assault cases and the importance of ensuring 
that the defence can rely on relevant evidence for legitimate purposes. I will 
argue that the law requires judges to take a broad view of relevance. In general, 
this generous approach to relevance permits consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding an alleged sexual assault, including the nature of the interactions 
5. See Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46, s 276. 
6. See e.g. R  Cain, 2010 ABCA 371 at para 30. 
7. See R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 169 DLR (4th) 193 [cited to SCR];  R v Barton, 
2017 ABCA 216 at para 180. 
8. See e.g. Elaine Craig, Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal 
Profession (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018) [Craig, Trials on Trial]; Melanie 
Randall, "Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and 'Ideal Victims': Consent, Resistance, and Victim 
Blaming" (2010) 22:2 CJWI. 397; David M Tanovich, "Regulating Inductive Reasoning in 
Sexual Assault Cases" in Benjamin L Berger, Emma Cunliffe & James Stribopolous, eds, To 
Ensure That Justice is Done: Essays in Memory of Marc Rosenberg (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 
2017) 73; Janine Benedet, "Probity, Prejudice and the Continuing Misuse of Sexual History 
Evidence" (2009) 64 CR (6th) 72 [Benedet, "Sexual History Evidence"]. 
9. See e.g. David M Paciocco, "Techniques for Eviscerating the Concept of Relevance: A 
Reply and Rejoinder to 'Sex with the Accused on Other Occasions: The Evisceration of Rape 
Shield Protection" (1995) 33 CR (4th) 365 [Paciocco, "Concept of Relevance"]. 
10. Don Stuart, Case Comment on R v Schmaltz, (2015) 17 CR (7th) 281 at 281 [Stuart, 
Comment on Schmaltz]. 
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between the accused and the complainant leading up to the alleged assault and 
in its aftermath. The accused's constitutional right to make full answer and 
defence demands that the defence be permitted to explore the circumstances 
surrounding the alleged assault without undue constraint.11  In this context, the 
legal disavowal of myths and stereotypes about sexual assault operates to prohibit 
use of evidence for particular purposes. Clarity is required in specifying these 
prohibited lines of reasoning. This analytical clarity is the key to distinguishing 
myths and stereotypes from legitimate inferences. 
The analysis will unfold in three parts. First, the concept of relevance will be 
discussed, along with the forms of evidence that can be relevant in adjudicating 
sexual assault cases. This discussion will show that relevance and admissibility 
of evidence are context-dependent and that relevance is not a demanding 
threshold. Second, the analysis will turn to myths and stereotypes about sexual 
assault. Some of these rejected myths will be identified, and the law's approach 
to removing them from the courtroom will be discussed, with special attention 
to the legal response to evidence of the complainant's sexual history and 
delayed disclosure of sexual assault. The third part of the analysis will focus on 
evidence about the complainant's relationship with the perpetrator subsequent 
to the alleged assault, which is one area where Canadian courts are currently 
grappling with how to distinguish legitimate inferences from prohibited myths. 
Ultimately, I will argue, the challenge is to ensure that judges and juries avoid 
prohibited lines of reasoning while retaining broad access to information 
about the circumstances and the ability to draw reasonable, context-specific 
inferences. 
I. Relevance in Sexual Assault 
This part reviews the law on relevance both in general and in the context 
of sexual assault cases specifically. Particular attention will be given to evidence 
relevant to consent, which is a central and frequently contested issue in sexual 
assault cases. 
A. The Relevance Requirement Generally 
The most fundamental rule of evidence in the common law system is that 
only relevant evidence is admissible, and all relevant evidence is admissible 
absent a clear reason to exclude it. ' 2  Evidence is considered relevant when "it has 
11. See Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 610-11; Ru Lyttle, 2004 SCC 5 at para 2; R  Schmaltz, 2015 
ABCA 4 at para 20 [Schmaltz ABCA]. 
12. See Morris v The Queen, [1983] 2 SCR 190, 1 DLR (4th) 385, Lamer J, dissenting on 
other grounds [Morris]; R  Grant, 2015 SCC 9 at para 18. 
any tendency to prove or disprove a fact in issue". " The rules of evidence prohibit 
certain uses of evidence and lines of reasoning, but beyond this the question 
whether evidence has the probative tendency required for relevance is a matter 
that is not decided by applying rules of law. Instead, relevance is governed 
by logic and human experience: "Relevance 
... requires a determination of 
whether as a matter of human experience and logic the existence of 'Fact A' 
makes the existence or non-existence of 'Fact B' more probable than it would 
be without the existence of 'Fact A'. If it does then 'Fact A' is relevant to 'Fact 
B'."4  To be considered relevant, evidence does not need to be conclusive of 
a factual issue or even to reach some less demanding threshold of probative 
value.'5  Relevance is a binary question and "any" probative value will do.'6 
An example may help to illustrate the expansiveness of this concept. 
Imagine a robbery case where the identity of the robber is the disputed issue, 
and there is evidence that the accused was in the neighbourhood an hour before 
the robbery. Obviously, the evidence is neither determinative of the issue of 
identity nor sufficient on its own to prove the issue of identity to any reasonable 
standard. The accused may be one of hundreds of people who were in the area. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the accused was in the area of the robbery near the 
time it occurred makes it more likely that the accused was the robber than it 
would be if we did not have this information about the accused's location. The 
evidence is therefore relevant on the issue of identity. 
Relevance is not a demanding test to meet. Moreover, where reasonable 
people disagree about whether evidence is relevant, the  law requires that we 
"err on the side of inclusi6n".'7
 The parties may disagree about whether the 
evidence has any logical bearing on the material issues, but where it is arguable 
that it does have a legitimate bearing, that evidence passes the test of relevance. 
Subject to the rules of evidence, ultimately it will be for the trier of fact to 
determine whether the evidence has any probative value in the context of the 
case as a whole. Chief Justice Dickson explained in R v Corbett 
basic principles of the law of evidence embody an inclusionary 
policy which would permit into evidence everything logically 
probative of some fact in issue, subject to the recognized rules 
of exclusion and exceptions thereto. Thereafter the question 
is one of weight. The evidence may carry much weight, little 
13. R  Grant, supra note 12. 
14. R  Watson (1996), 30 OR (3d) 161 at 177, 50 CR (4th) 245 (CA). 
15. See Morris, supra note 12. 
16. R  Grant, supra note 12 at para 18. 
17. Paciocco, "Concept of Relevance", supra note 9 at 367. 
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weight, or no weight at all. If error is to be made it should be 
on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion.18 
The "inclusionary policy" of the law means that evidence should not be excluded 
as "irrelevant" where there is a reasonable argument that it has some probative 
value for a legitimate inferential purpose. 
This inclusionary inclination is particularly appropriate to relevance 
determinations made in the course of trials, because the probative value of 
any individual piece of evidence must ultimately be determined in relation 
to all the other evidence in the case.19  Relevance is therefore inherently 
contextual, and categorical prejudgments about it are inappropriate.20  The 
law's inclusive attitude toward relevance also has special salience in relation 
to defence evidence. The accused has a right to make full answer and defence 
under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.21 
Canadian courts therefore take great care to ensure that the defence has access 
to relevant evidence .22  In the words of McLachlin J (as she then was) writing 
for a majority in R v Seaboyer, "to deny a defendant the building blocks of his 
defence is often to deny him the defence itself".23 
Of course, relevant evidence is not necessarily admissible. Relevant evidence 
will be excluded if it is subject to an exclusionary rule or, generally, if the trial 
judge concludes that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect .24 
Prejudice is a complex concept that includes the tendency of the evidence to 
create unfairness against the opposing party, to generate confusion or waste time 
in the trial, or to invite prohibited lines of reasoning.25  Evidence that supports 
18. [1988] 1 SCR 670 at 697, 28 BCLR (2d) 145. 
19. See R v Blackman, 2008 SCC 37 at para 30; R v Morin, [1988] 2 SCR 345 at 370, 66 
CR (3rd) 1. 
20. See Paciocco, "Concept of Relevance", supra note 9. 
21. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, ss 7, 11(d), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 604; 
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 7th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 
2018) at 222 [Stuart, Charter Justice] 
22. See Seaboyer, supra note 4 (recognizing that "Canadian courts, like courts in most common 
law jurisdictions, have been extremely cautious in restricting the power of the accused to call 
evidence" at 611). 
23. Ibid at 614. 
24. See R v Grant, supra note 12; Morris, supra note 12; Seaboyer, supra note 4. 
25. See R v Grant, supra note 12 (unknown third party suspect evidence carries prejudicial 
effect of confusing issues and wasting trial time); R v Corbett, supra note 18 (prejudicial effect 
of criminal record evidence flows from tendency to invite prohibited inference from propensity 
to guilt). 
a prohibited line of reasoning and has no relevance for any other purpose has 
no legitimate probative value and will be inadmissible. As the Supreme Court 
of Canada noted in Seaboyer, more difficult issues arise where evidence has 
relevance for some permissible purpose but also supports some other, prohibited 
line of reasoning.26
 In such cases the admissibility of the evidence depends on 
the balancing of the probative value of the evidence in relation to its permissible 
use against its potential prejudicial effect in terms of its tendency to invite 
prohibited reasoning. Because of the special reluctance to exclude evidence 
supporting the defence, this balancing is adjusted so that relevant defence 
evidence is only excluded where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its 
probative value .27 
While a finding that evidence is relevant is not conclusive of admissibility, 
a finding that evidence is irrelevant is conclusive of admissibility. Irrelevant 
evidence is automatically inadmissible, and no legitimate inferences can be 
drawn from it. Questions inviting irrelevant evidence in response cannot be 
asked of witnesses
 .21
 These stark consequences of finding evidence irrelevant, 
along with the contextual nature of the relevance inquiry, confirm the wisdom 
of the broad view of relevance accepted in Canadian law. 
B. Relevance and Consent 
The disputed issues in sexual assault cases often include the question 
whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity that occurred. This 
section considers the evidence that can be relevant to the issue of consent. 'The 
analysis will show that, like other disputed issues, consent is an issue susceptible 
of proof by both direct and circumstantial evidence.2' 
26. See supra note 4 (noting that "the same piece of evidence may have value to the trial 
process but bring with it the danger that it may prejudice the fact-finding process on another 
issue" at 609). 
27. See ibidat6ll. 
28. See R v Lyttle, supra note 11 at para 44; R v Osolin, [1993] 4 SCR 595, 109 DLR (4th) 
478 [cited to SCR] (noting that cross-examination "must conform to the basic principle that all 
evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible" at 665). 
29. It should be acknowledged that lawyers and judges frequently avoid engaging directly 
with the relevance of circumstantial evidence in sexual assault cases by claiming that evidence 
of the circumstances is being admitted to go to the "narrative". For recent examples of uses of 
this narrative concept in sexual assault cases, see R vJH, 2018 ONCA 245 at paras 33-34; R 
v Qhasimy, 2018 ABCA 228 at para 12; R v Shenava, 2017 ONSC 7667 (CanLil) at 14-15; 
F v DKN, 2017 ONSC 3890 at paras 67-77. While it may sometimes be necessary in the 
course of trials to hear evidence solely for the purpose of establishing a coherent narrative of the 
underlying events, the judge must decide whether an item of evidence is relevant to a disputed 
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Lack of consent on the part of the complainant is an element of the actus 
reus of sexual assault."' Like all elements of the offence, absence of consent 
must be proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt before the accused 
can be convicted. Consent for the purposes of sexual assault is defined in the 
Criminal Code as "the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in 
the sexual activity in question"." 'What the Crown must prove, then, is that 
the complainant did not voluntarily agree to the sexual activity that is charged 
as sexual assault. In the landmark case of R v Ewanchuk, the Supreme Court 
of Canada confirmed that consent is a question of the complainant's state of 
mind at the time of the sexual activity. 12  Consent is subjective in the sense that 
it exists in the mind of the complainant.33  To be effective, consent must also be 
contemporaneous with the sexual activity. 14 
These two features of consent—that it is subjective and contemporaneous—
are central to understanding the offence of sexual assault under Canadian 
law. They are part and parcel of a conception of consent that laudably aims 
to protect the bodily integrity of sexual assault complainants, who are usually 
women, and to prevent sexual exploitation." These two features also sometimes 
generate misunderstandings about the evidence that is relevant and probative 
on the issue of consent. Subjectivity and contemporaneity are features of the 
absence of consent on the facts, which is the object of proof. They are not 
requirements limiting the evidence that goes to consent. One might, however, 
mistakenly conclude that if consent must be subjective and contemporaneous 
then the evidence that goes to consent must share those features. 
issue at trial before it can be relied upon directly in deciding the case. The analysis in this paper 
therefore focuses on whether evidence is relevant and admissible, and not on whether it might 
be admitted as narrative. 
30. See  v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 at para 25. 
31. Supra note 5, s 273.1(1). Some situations where no consent is obtained are listed in 
subsections 265(3) and 273.1(2) of the Criminal Code; these include where the complainant 
lacks capacity to consent and where consent is vitiated by fraud (ibid, 55 265(3), 273.1(2)). 
Subsection 273.1(1.2) of the Criminal Code, which was introduced in December 2018, 
provides that "whether no consent is obtained" under these sections is a question of law (ibid, 
273.1(1.2)). The effect of this subsection is uncertain, but it will likely make trial findings under 
these subsections reviewable on appeal on a standard of correctness. 
32. Sec supra note 7 at para 26. 
33. See ibid. 
34. Sec e.g. R vIA, 2011 SCC 28 at para 46. Parliament recently reaffirmed this principle by 
enacting the new subsection 273.1(1.1) of the Criminal Code, which provides: "Consent must 
be present at the time the sexual activity in question takes place." Sec supra note 5, s 273.1(1.1). 
35. See generally R vIA, supra note 34. 
Consider first the fact that consent is subjective: the object of proof is the 
complainant's state of mind. Since consent is subjective, one might think that 
a court would be bound to prefer or accept the complainant's "subjective" 
testimonial account of her own state of mind, or that evidence relevant to 
consent is limited to the complainant's account. To understand why these 
intuitions are misguided, it is helpful to consider how mental states are proven 
in the criminal law generally. Professor Stuart, Canada's leading scholar on the 
subjective/objective distinction in criminal law, 36
 explained that for crimes 
of subjective fault, "the trier of fact must determine what was actually going 
on in the mind of this particular accused at the time in question".37  The law 
understands the presence or absence of the requisite state of mind as a fact 
about which there is a ground truth and which is susceptible of proof like other 
facts.3' The evidence that bears on this question can include direct testimony 
from accused persons about their own mental states, but it can also include any 
circumstantial evidence that speaks to state of mind. Stuart put it succinctly: 
"even where the substantive test is subjective awareness, the approach to proof 
is objective". 39 
These insights about the objective approach to proof of subjective mens rea are 
equally applicable to proof of non-consent in cases of sexual assault. The factual 
issue to be decided is the complainant's state of mind, but the complainant's 
testimony is not determinative because her account of her mental state at the 
time (like the evidence of any witness testifying to any factual issue) might be 
dishonest or mistaken.4° Just as it is wrong to think that accused persons will 
always be acquitted when they deny having had the requisite mens rea,4' it is a 
36. Stuart's work is cited in Ewanchuk in support of the proposition that consent is a matter 
of "the complainant's subjective internal state of mind". See R v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 at para 
26. His work is also frequently cited on the broader question of subjective tests in the criminal 
law. See R  Hundal, [1993] 1 SCR 867, 19 CR (4th) 169 (majority and concurring judgments 
citing Stuart on subjective tests); R v Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 (citing Stuart on wilful blindness as 
a subjective state of mind); R  Tatton, 2015 SCC 33 (citing Stuart on the specific and general 
intent in intoxication). 
37. Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 7th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 179 
[Stuart, Criminal Law]. 
38. See ibid at 177 
39. Ibid at 176. 
40. To acknowledge that sexual assault complainants might, like any witnesses, be dishonest 
or mistaken about factual issues is not to endorse the discredited myth that sexual assault 
complainants are uniquely likely to be fabricating their accounts. See infra note 71 and 
accompanying text. On the other hand, to start from the proposition that complainants must 
be believed would run contrary to basic norms of the criminal trial, including the presumption 
of innocence. See e.g. R  Nyznik, 2017 ONSC 4392 at para 17. 
41. See Stuart, Criminal Law, supra note 37 at 176-77. 
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mistake to think that non-consent is necessarily established by a complainant's 
testimonial claim of non-consent. In both cases the factual issues must be 
decided by reference to the whole of the evidence, including any circumstantial 
evidence that could undermine witnesses' testimonial claims about their own 
states of mind. 
In the context of subjective mens rea, relevant circumstantial evidence often 
takes the form of evidence about the nature of the accused's acts, which can 
give rise to reasonable inferences about what was in the accused's mind. For 
example, an accused person who calmly shoots another person in the head will 
likely be found to have intended to kill even if the accused denies that intention 
on the stand .42  With respect to consent in sexual assault, the defence may point 
to evidence of the complainant's acts and communications suggesting that 
there was in fact voluntary agreement to engage in the sexual activity; even if 
the complainant now says there was no consent .4' As Professor Stuart observed, 
"to determine what was in the complainant's mind, one source of evidence is 
the complainant's testimony and another is drawing reasonable inferences from 
the complainant's conduct" . "
 
The requirement that consent must be contemporaneous with the sexual 
activity raises similar issues. The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
a lack of consent at the very time of the sexual activity. But evidence relevant 
to this factual question can come from other time periods. The Supreme Court 
of Canada clearly recognized this possibility in Ewanchuk: "It is open to the 
accused to claim that the complainant's words and actions, before and during 
the incident, raise a reasonable doubt against her assertion that she, in her mind, 
did not want the sexual touching to take place."" In sum, while consent is 
subjective and contemporaneous, evidence going to consent can come from 
sources other than the complainant and can be linked to time periods other 
than the moment of the alleged assault. The relevance requirement demands 
only that the evidence logically support an inference that consent was more or 
less likely to have been present at the time of the sexual activity. 
While Canadian law on these points is clear, misunderstandings have arisen 
in the cases and commentaries. In R v Ururyar, a female complainant testified 
that the male accused, an acquaintance, engaged in sexual activity with her, 
42. See ibid. 
43. See e.g. Janine Benedet, "Barton: 'She Knew What She Was Coming For': Sexual Assault, 
Prostitution and the Meaning of Consent" (2017) 38 CR (7th) 445 at 449 [Benedet, "Barton"]. 
44. Don Stuart, "Ewanchuk: Asserting 'No Means No' at the Expense of Fault and 
Proportionality Principles" (1999) 22 CR (5th) 39 at 43. See also R v Ewanchuk, supra note 
7 (stating that "[w]hile  the complainant's testimony is the only source of direct evidence as to 
her state of mind, credibility must still be assessed. . . in light of all the evidence" at para 29). 
45. Supra note 7 at para 29 [emphasis added]. 
including intercourse, without her consent.46
 The accused testified that the 
sexual activity was all consensual. The accused and the complainant met up at a 
bar where other friends were also gathered, and later they went to the accused's 
apartment, where the sexual activity took place. The evidence included a text 
message sent a few hours before the alleged assault from the complainant to the 
accused, inviting the accused to the bar and saying, "[c]  ome drink and then 
we can have hot sex.1147  The trial judge concluded that the text message was 
irrelevant, and while his reasons are unclear, they could charitably be interpreted 
as suggesting that the text was irrelevant because it was not contemporaneous 
with the sexual activity. 
As a matter of logic and human experience, however, the fact that the 
complainant hours earlier expressed a willingness to engage in consensual 
sex with the accused had an obvious bearing on the disputed factual issue of 
consent. As a general proposition, the law accepts that a person's expressed 
intention to do something at a future time can be evidence that the person went 
on to do that thing.48  The text message was not, of course, determinative of 
the issue of consent; people do not always follow through with their expressed 
intentions, and in the context of sexual touching a complainant is free to 
change her mind at any time .4' But relevance does not require that the evidence 
be determinative. As a piece of circumstantial evidence that could shed light 
on whether the complainant voluntarily agreed in her mind at the time of the 
sexual activity, the text message was relevant on the issue of consent.5° 
R v Nyznik provides another example of a court appearing to limit evidence 
relevant to consent to evidence contemporaneous with the sexual activity.51 
The case involved three male police officers accused of sexually assaulting the 
female complainant in a hotel room after a night of drinking. The complainant 
testified that she did not consent to the sexual activity and that in any event 
she was incapacitated by alcohol, drugs administered without her knowledge, 
or a combination of the two. The defence claimed that all the sexual activity 
was consensual and one of the accused testified to that effect. In the course 
46. 2016 ONCJ 448. 
47. Ibid at para 52. 
48. See R v Starr, 2000 SCC 40 (hearsay exception for statements of present intention 
permitting "statements of intent.., to support an inference that the declarant followed through 
on the intended course of action, provided it is reasonable on the evidence for the trier of fact 
to infer that the declarant did so" at para 169). 
49. See R vJA, supra note 34 at Para 40. 
50. See Ururyar ONSC, supra note 2. In allowing the appeal against conviction, Dambrot J 
reasoned that the text was relevant on the issue of consent because it "was part of the narrative 
of the present encounter" and could be understood as an expression of consent (ibid at para 39). 
51. See supra note 40. 
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of a carefully-reasoned judgment acquitting the accused, Molloy J wrote the 
following about the evidence relevant to consent: 
To be clear, it does not matter that the complainant appeared 
to be interested in Mr. Nyznik. It does not matter that she 
was flirting, or kissing Mr. Kara, or that she willingly agreed 
to accompany a group of her male workplace colleagues to 
a strip bar. It does not matter if she was exchanging sexual 
banter with the other two men in the back seat of the cab. 
It would not even matter if she proposed going back to the 
hotel to have group sex (although I hasten to add that I am 
not finding as a fact that she made such a proposition). In 
terms of consent, all that matters is what happened at the time of 
the activity in question. Did the complainant consent? Or was 
she too incapacitated to consent? 'Whatever the complainant 
said or did earlier that night does not mean she consented 
later. 52 
To be sure, the factual issue to be decided is whether the complainant 
consented at the time of the sexual activity. It is also undoubtedly true that 
the complainant's words and actions earlier in the evening "[do]  not mean she 
consented later", in the sense that they are not determinative of the issue .51 
Still, the complainant's words and actions earlier in the evening might be 
circumstantial evidence relevant to the disputed issue of consent. It goes too 
far to suggest that the complainant's conduct and communications earlier 
in the evening "[do]  not matter" or are irrelevant simply because they took 
place before the sexual touching. 14  This reasoning confuses the substantive rule 
that consent must be contemporaneous with the evidentiary requirement of 
relevance. Particularly problematic is the suggestion that even if the complainant 
had suggested that the group go to the hotel room to have group sex, this fact 
would be irrelevant on the issue of consent. In fact, like the text message in 
R v Ururyar,55  such an expression of an intention to engage in consensual sex 
with the accused would have clear relevance on the issue of consent, because 
a person's expressed intentions are relevant to the question whether the person 
went on to act in accordance with those intentions. 
A similar issue arises in one passage in Professor Elaine Craig's important 
new book on sexual assault trials in Canada. In discussing R v Schmaltz,56  a 
52. Ibid at para 138 [emphasis added]. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid. 
55. See Ururyar ONSC, supra note 2 at para 39. 
56. See Schmaltz ABCA, supra note 11. 
case where consent was in issue and evidence was led about whether there 
was flirting earlier in the evening between the accused and the complainant, 
Professor Craig writes: "Under Canadian law, whether the complainant was 
flirting earlier in the evening is irrelevant to the issue of consent. Consent to 
sexual touching must be contemporaneous. It must be given at the time of the 
sexual contact."57  To the extent that it relies on the timing of the flirting to 
argue its irrelevance to consent, this argument seems to confuse a requirement 
of the substantive law with an evidentiary requirement. As explained above, 
the fact that consent must be contemporaneous does not mean that evidence 
relevant to the factual question of consent must also be contemporaneous. 
In fairness to Professor Craig, the claim that the earlier flirting was irrelevant 
to consent appears defensible on the facts of the case. Schmaltz involved an 
allegation that the male accused digitally penetrated the complainant's vagina 
while she was asleep, while the accused testified that the sexual activity was 
consensual.55  In that factual context, it is difficult to see how any flirtatious 
behaviour on the part of the complainant earlier in the evening could have 
much logical bearing on the question of consent.59 
The discussion and examples above demonstrate that circumstantial evidence 
can assist the defence in raising a reasonable doubt on the issue of consent. 
Circumstantial evidence can also assist the Crown in proving non-consent. 
Indeed, the Crown must rely exclusively on circumstantial evidence to prove 
non-consent in cases where complainants are unavailable to testify or for other 
reasons cannot recall and communicate their states of mind at the time of the 
sexual activity.60
 Most often a lack of memory flows from intoxication. In R v 
Al-Rawi, for example, a taxi driver was accused of sexually assaulting a woman.61 
According to the facts as found by the trial judge, the complainant had been 
refused admission into a nightclub because she was intoxicated, and she hailed 
the accused's taxi to take her home. Eleven minutes later, a police officer found 
the complainant unconscious, naked from the breasts down in the back of the 
taxi. The accused had his pants partly undone and was observed trying to hide 
57. Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8 at 183-84 [footnotes omitted]. 
58. See ibid; R v Schmaltz, [2015] AJ No 1444 (QL) (Alta Prov Ct). 
59. In dissent in Schmaltz ABCA, Paperny JA reasoned that the flirting "does not go to the 
Ultimate issue at trial, namely whether the complainant consented to being digitally penetrated 
by the appellant". See supra note 11 at para 82. See also Stuart, Comment on Schmaltz, supra 
note 10 (stating "it seems likely that any earlier flirting that night had little probative force on 
the issue of whether there was consent" at 282). One might even argue that earlier flirting by 
the complainant amounted to other sexual activity that should be excluded by the rape shield 
provisions, although those provisions are not generally applied to exclude sexual interactions 
between the accused and the complainant on the same occasion as the alleged sexual assault. 
60. SeeR vAl-Rawi, 2018 NSCA 10 at para 69. 
61. See ibid. 
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the complainant's urine-soaked pants and underwear. 'The complainant did not 
know the accused and later had no memory of her interaction with him. 
The trial judge found that the accused touched the complainant sexually 
when he removed her pants and underwear, but went on to conclude that there 
was no evidence on the issue of consent. 12  The trial judge reasoned: "at the 
critical time of when Mr. Al Rawi would have stripped the complainant of 
her clothes, the Crown has provided absolutely no evidence on the issue of lack 
Of consent" .61  As in the cases discussed above, here the trial judge mistakenly 
reasoned that evidence relevant to consent is limited to the complainant's direct 
evidence of non-consent or other evidence contemporaneous with the sexual 
touching. In fact, as the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal noted in allowing the 
Crown's appeal against the acquittal, in the Al-Rawi case "there was ample 
circumstantial evidence that would permit the inference to be drawn that either 
the complainant did not voluntarily agree or lacked the capacity to do Sol'  .64 
That the complainant was on her way home in a taxi, so intoxicated that she 
had already urinated in her pants and was unconscious minutes later, surely 
provides a strong basis for rejecting the defence claim that the complainant 
was capable of, and actually did, consent to sexual activity with a stranger.65 
The trial judge's failure to consider this evidence, and his repeated erroneous 
assertions that there was no evidence on the issue of consent, amounted to an 
error of law demanding appellate intervention.66 
C. Context and Circumstances 
At the stage of determining relevance, it is appropriate to take a broad view 
of the circumstances that may have a bearing on disputed factual issues in sexual 
assault cases. Evidence relevant to consent can include circumstantial evidence, 
including evidence of "the complainant's words and actions, before and during 
the incident" .17  While the focus has been on the issue of consent, circumstantial 
evidence can play a similar role in cases that raise issues of mistaken belief in 
consent (where the accused's state of mind is at issue) or where the occurrence of 
the sexual activity itself is disputed. In general, subject to the rules of evidence 
and the prohibited lines of reasoning that will be discussed in the next section, 
62. See ibid. The trial judge repeatedly and clearly expressed the view that there was no 
evidence of a lack of consent at the relevant time (ibid at paras 89, 92). 
63. Ibid at para 93 [emphasis in original] (quoting from the trial judge's reasons). 
64. Ibid at para 94. 
65. For further discussion, see Elaine Craig, "Judging Sexual Assault Trials: Systemic Failure in 
the Case of Regina v Bassam Al-Rawi" (2017) 95:1 Can Bar Rev 179. 
66. See  vAl-Rawi, supra note 60 at para 103. 
67. R v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 at para 29. 
both the Crown and the defence should be afforded the opportunity to bring 
evidence of the circumstances of the alleged assault that may assist the trier of 
fact in making reasonable findings of fact. 
u!FID ilill Ii4S F1 
Assessing relevance requires judges and juries to interpret the meaning 
and value of evidence, including evidence of human behavior, in light of their 
understanding and experience. This open-ended inquiry creates space for the 
operation of biases and misconceptions, especially in the area of sexual assault. 
As L'Heureux-Dubé J observed in Seaboyer, determinations of relevance are 
"particularly vulnerable to the application of private beliefs [because they are] 
filled by the particular judge's experience, common sense and/or logic"." 
Sexual assault, she further explained, is one domain where "experience, common 
sense and logic are informed by stereotype and myth"." The Supreme Court 
of Canada has subsequently acknowledged that myths and stereotypes about 
sexual assault have operated to unfairly discredit complainants in cases of sexual 
assault and abuse.7° 
This part explores how these myths have operated in our law and the 
efforts that have been made to eliminate them from the adjudication of sexual 
assault cases. After identifying a number of forms of reasoning that have been 
rejected, the analysis will focus on the law's response to the discriminatory uses 
of evidence of the complainant's sexual history and delayed complaint. This 
part will conclude with suggestions for a general approach courts might take 
in trying to avoid stereotypical and discriminatory reasoning. I will argue that 
myths and stereotypes about sexual assault are properly understood as prohibited 
68. Supra note 4 at 679. 
69. Ibid. 
70. See e.g. R v Find, 2001 SCC 32. 'The unanimous Court held that 
myths and stereotypes about . . . complainants are particularly invidious 
because they comprise part of the fabric of social 'common sense in which 
we are daily immersed. Their pervasiveness, and the subtlety of their 
operation, create the risk that victims of abuse will be blamed or unjustly 
discredited in the minds of both judges and jurors. 
Ibid at pars 103. See also R v Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668, 180 DLR (4th) 1 [cited to SCR].  The 
majority noted that "speculative myths, stereotypes, and generalized assumptions about sexual 
assault victims . . . have too often in the past hindered the search for truth and imposed harsh 
and irrelevant burdens on complainants in prosecutions of sexual offences" (ibid at para 119). 
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inferences, and that the law can and should manage the distinction between 
prohibited and legitimate inferences by defining clearly the lines of reasoning 
that are forbidden. 
A. Some Recognized Myths 
In Canadian legal discourse, the phrase "myths and stereotypes" refers 
to false beliefs about sexual assault that distort the fact-finding process.71 
Sometimes these beliefs are false in the factual sense that they do not match 
the known realities of sexual assault as a social phenomenon. The beliefs that 
sexual assault complainants are uniquely likely to be lying,72  and that rapists are 
usually strangers to their victims,73  fall into this category. Other sexual assault 
myths involve misconceptions about the law and legal responsibility; such as the 
beliefs that non-consent must be demonstrated through physical resistance,74 
that a complainant's consent can be implied from the circumstances even in 
the absence of voluntary agreement in the complainant's mind,75
 and that a 
complainant's testimonial account must be corroborated by independent 
evidence before guilt can be proven .71  It is difficult to know how widely-held 
71. See R  Find, supra note 70 at paras 101-03; R v Mills, supra note 70 at para 119. 
72. See Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8 (discussing the history and tenacity of the idea 
that "false rape allegations are prevalent" at 95);  Robyn Doolittle, "Unfounded: Why Police 
Dismiss 1 in 5 Sexual Assault Claims as Baseless", The Globe and Mail (3  February 2017), 
online: <theglobeandmail.com/news/investigationslunfounded-sexual-assault-canada-msin/ 
artic1e33891309> (documenting widespread disbelief of sexual assault complainants by 
Canadian police). 
73. See Seaboyer, supra note 4, L'Heuteux-Dubé J, dissenting in part (noting reliance on 
stereotypes to discredit sexual assault complainants, including the stereotype of the "[riapist 
as a [s]tranger"  at 652-53); Statistics Canada, Self-Reported Sexual Assault in Canada, 2014, by 
Shana Conroy & Adam Cotter, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 11 July 
2017) (great majority of sexual assaults perpetrated by friend, acquaintance, neighbour, family 
member or spouse). 
74. See e.g. R v Barton, supra note 7 (tenacity of "ghost element' of victim resistance" in sexual 
assault at para 156). 
75. See R v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 (trial judge erred in relying on spurious defence of "implied 
consent" and concluding that complainant's conduct amounted to consent even though she did 
not consent in her mind at para 31). 
76. The former requirement that the complainant's testimony be corroborated was abrogated 
by the enactment of what is now section 274 of the Criminal Code, which provides that, for 
sexual offences, "no corroboration is required for a conviction and the judge shall not instruct 
the jury that it is unsafe to find the accused guilty in the absence of corroboration." See supra 
note 5, s 274. 
are these beliefs in Canadian society; but the Supreme Court of Canada has 
accepted that such myths are common enough that they can and do distort the 
adjudication of sexual assault cases .77 
Regrettably, Canadian case law furnishes many examples of lawyers and 
judges endorsing these misconceptions. 71  For example, in R v SB, the Court of 
Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador determined that the trial judge erred in 
permitting defence counsel to lead evidence of the complainant's sexual history 
that depicted her as promiscuous and led to her "gratuitous humiliation and 
denigration" .79  The most notorious recent example is that of then Camp J, 
whose egregious conduct in the 2014 trial in R v Wagar°—which included 
his asking a sexual assault complainant why she could not just keep her knees 
together to ward off the sexual assault—led the Canadian Judicial Council to 
recommend his removal from the bench.81 
While it would be difficult to compile an exhaustive list, and there has been 
no attempt to do so here, numerous myths and stereotypes have been recognized 
in Canadian law and can be readily identified. The two most notorious surround 
complainants, usually women, who have previously engaged in sexual activity. 
These discriminatory inferences are known as the "twin myths"82  and they hold 
that: 
i. a complainant's sexual experience makes it more likely that she 
consented on the occasion in question; and 
ii. a complainant's sexual experience undermines her credibility as a 
witness 83 
Other discriminatory beliefs about sexual assault complainants include: 
i. a woman who dresses in a sexually appealing or provocative manner 
lacks credibility or is responsible if she is sexually assaulted;84  and 
77. See R v Find, supra note 70 (where the court discussed the "prevailing existence of such 
myths and stereotypes" at para 101). 
78. For sources citing many examples of such mythical and stereotypical reasoning in recent 
Canadian trials, see Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8; Randall, supra note 8; Tanovich, supra 
note 8; Benedet, "Sexual History Evidence", supra note 8. 
79. 2016 NLCA 20 at paras 60, 43, rev'd on other grounds 2017 SCC 16. 
80. (2014) CarswellAlta 2756 (Alta Prov Ct). 
81. See Canadian Judicial Council Inquiry into the Conduct of the Honourable Robin Camp: 
Report to the Minister ofJustice (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 2017). Justice Camp later 
resigned. 
82. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 604. 
83. See ibid; R v Darrach, 2000 SCC 46 at para 2. 
84. See e.g. R v Cain, supra note 6 ("long-discredited myths and stereotypes about women 
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ii. consultation with a mental health professional, in itself, indicates that 
a complainant is not a reliable witness.85 
Some myths surround what constitutes consent, including: 
i. a lack of verbal objection constitutes consent;86
 and 
ii. a lack of physical resistance constitutes consent.87 
Finally, the law rejects a number of common but unrealistic expectations about 
how people who have experienced sexual assault behave, including: 
i. a real victim of sexual assault will resist physically;" 
ii. by virtue of having resisted physically, a real victim will be physically 
injured;89 
iii. a real victim will immediately report the assault to police;" and 
iv. a real victim will thereafter avoid the perpetrator.91 
Each of these misconceptions has been recognized as an inference from evidence 
that is capable of distorting the fact-finding process in sexual assault trials. 
B. Two Key Examples 
To understand how the law seeks to remove these myths and stereotypes, it 
will be useful to consider more closely two forms of evidence: the complainant's 
sexual history and delayed complaint. These two forms of evidence have much 
in common. In both cases, certain inferences from the evidence that are now 
rejected as stereotypes were once endorsed by the common law. Both areas 
have seen statutory reform aimed at rejecting these stereotypes, followed by 
developments in the case law. Examination of how these forms of evidence 
are regulated in Canadian law will yield insights into the greater project of 
removing myths and stereotypes from the adjudication of sexual assault cases. 
deserving to be raped because they dress provocatively" at Para 30). 
85. See e.g. RvMil1s, supra note 70 at Para 119. 
86. See e.g. R v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 ("that silence, passivity or ambiguous conduct 
constitutes consent is a mistake of law" at Para 51). 
87. See e.g. R v Barton, supra note 7 ("historical tendency to treat a complainant's silence, non-
resistance or submission as 'implied consent" at Para 180 [emphasis in original]). 
88. See ibid; Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 651-52. 
89. See e.g. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 660. 
90. Sec e.g. R v W(R), [1992] 2 SCR 122 at 136, 13 CR (4th) 257. 
91. See e.g. R v Caesar, 2015 NWTCA 4 at Para 6. 
(i) Complainant's Sexual History 
Historically, the common law permitted a rape complainant to be cross-
examined about her sexual reputation and her prior sexual acts with the accused 
and others.92  These matters were understood as relevant to the complainant's 
credibility as a witness because the common law viewed "unchaste" women as 
less worthy of belief.93  The complainant's sexual reputation and sexual history 
with the accused were also seen as relevant to consent because "unchaste" women 
were viewed as more likely to consent generally94  and having consented to sex 
with the accused in the past was thought to suggest consent on the occasion in 
question.95  The common law's assumptions about women, and particularly the 
"twin myths" that sexually experienced women are more likely to consent and 
less worthy of belief, are obviously offensive. More than a quarter century ago, 
the Supreme Court of Canada proclaimed these twin myths "discredited".96 
Legislative attempts to combat these stereotypes have come in the form 
of rape shield laws. An early version of Canada's rape shield provisions came 
into force in 1983, restricting cross-examination and other evidence on the 
complainant's sexual activity on other occasions. The 1983 law made evidence 
of the complainant's sexual reputation inadmissible to go to credibility, and also 
excluded all evidence of the complainant's sexual activity with anyone other 
than the accused, with three stipulated exceptions.97  In Seaboyer, the Supreme 
Court of Canada struck down section 276 of the Criminal Code, which 
demanded "blanket exclusion" of sexual history evidence that did not fit within 
the exceptions.98  By a majority, the Court held that the legislated exceptions 
92. See Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 604; R v Krausz (1973), 57 Cr App R 466 at 472 (CA (Eng)); 
Ronald Joseph Delisle et al, Evidence: Principles and Problems, 12th ed (Toronto: Thomson 
Reuters, 2018) at 296-97. 
93. In Seaboyer, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that historically the common 
law accepted "that unchaste women were more likely to consent to intercourse and in any event, 
were less worthy of belief". See supra note 4 at 604. 
94.Ibid. 
95. See Delisle et al, supra note 92 at 296-97. 
96. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 604. 
97. See Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34, ss 246.6-246.7, as amended by An Act to amend 
the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person and to amend 
certain otherActs in relation thereto or in consequence thereof SC 1980-81-82-83, c 125, s 19. At 
the time these provisions were struck down in Seaboyer, they had been renumbered as sections 
276 and 277. See Criminal Code, supra note 5, ss 276-77, as it appeared on 14 August 1992 
(other sexual activity and reputation evidence, respectively). 
98. Supra note 4at6l3. 
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were insufficient because there were other situations where the complainal 
sexual history would be relevant and probative for the defence without relying 
on myths or stereotypes.99  Blanket exclusion of sexual history evidence violated 
the accused's Charter right to a fair trial by excluding evidence potentially "of 
critical relevance to the defence".'°° 
Following Seaboyer, Parliament amended the rape shield provisions to 
comply with the Charter. The version of section 276 that was adopted at that 
time remains largely in force today. Parliament passed some amendments to 
the section in December 2018,101
 but for the most part these amendments 
do not appear to change the legal tests for admissibility of evidence of the 
complainant's sexual history. One key provision that has remained constant 
since 1992 is subsection 276(1), which provides that in sexual offence cases: 
276(1) . . . evidence that the complainant has engaged in 
sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other 
person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by 
reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant 
(a)is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity 
that forms the subject-matter of the charge; or 
(b) is less worthy of belief. 112 
Subsection 276(1) operates to prohibit entirely the admission of evidence of the 
complainant's other sexual activity to support the twin myths. 
Next, subsection 276(2) makes sexual history evidence generally inadmissible 
but allows for its admission when four conditions of admissibility are met. That 
subsection was amended in 2018 and currently provides that in sexual offence 
cases: 
276(2) . . . evidence shall not be adduced by or on behalf 
of the accused that the complainant has engaged in sexual 
activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject-
matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any 
other person, unless . . . the evidence 
(a) is not being adduced for the purpose of supporting 
an inference described in subsection (1); 
99. See ibid (stating that "jurisprudence affords numerous examples of evidence of sexual con-
duct which would he excluded by s. 276 but which clearly should be received in the interests of a 
fair trial"). 
100. Ibid at616. 
101. See An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department ofJustice Act and to make 
consequential amendments to another Act, SC 2018, c 29. 
102. Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 276(1). 
(b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and [sic] 
(c) is of specific instances of sexual activity; and 
(d) has significant probative value that is not substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the 
proper administration of justice.103 
The first condition of admissibility—that the evidence is not being adduced to 
support the twin myths prohibited in subsection 276(1)—was added in 2018. 
This addition does not appear to change the effect of the provision, since twin 
myths reasoning was already, and remains, prohibited by subsection 276(1). 
The last major component of the analysis is subsection 276(3), which 
like subsection 276(1) was unaffected by the recent amendments. Subsection 
276(3) lays out a number of factors judges are required to take into account 
in determining the admissibility of such evidence. These factors include the 
accused's right to make full answer and defence, the complainant's dignity 
and privacy, the need to remove discriminatory biases from fact-finding, and 
society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault.104  The broad 
range of factors to be considered in the admissibility decision reflects a legislative 
intention not only to eliminate prohibited forms of reasoning based on sexual 
history but also to prevent the use of sexual history evidence to harass, demean 
or intimidate sexual assault complainants. 
Finally, the 2018 amendments added a new subsection, 276(4), which 
provides: "For the purpose of this section, sexual activity includes any 
communication made for a sexual purpose or whose content is of a sexual 
nature." 101  This new subsection seems likely to present courts with interpretive 
challenges. For example, should it be read to apply to communications from the 
complainant to the accused that could indicate consent? Would it, for example, 
cover the "[c] ome drink and then we can have hot sex" text message that was 
sent by the complainant to the accused a few hours before the alleged sexual 
assault in Ururyar,'°6
 as discussed above?117  One might argue that the rape shield 
provisions should not apply to such communications between the complainant 
and the accused because, provided that they take place on the same occasion as 
the alleged sexual assault, they are not "other" sexual activity but rather are part 
and parcel of "the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge". "' 
Alternatively, one might conclude that the rape shield provisions do apply to 
such communications, and that their admissibility must be determined under 
103. Ibid,s276(2). 
104. See ibid. s276(3). 
105. Ibid, s 276(4) [emphasis in original]. 
106. Ururyar ONSC, supra note 2 at para 37. 
107. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
108. Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 276(2). 
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subsection 276(2) by weighing their legitimate probative value on issues 
including consent against their prejudicial effect, including their tendency, if 
any, to invite twin myths reasoning. 
An even more difficult and long-standing problem of interpretation is to 
determine exactly what subsection 276(1) prohibits. Early on, some read the 
legislation broadly to prohibit all use of sexual history evidence to go to consent 
and credibility, a construction that raised Charter concerns because it seemed 
to recreate the kind of blanket exclusion criticized in Seaboyer.'°9  This broad 
construction has not been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. In R v 
Crosby, for example, the Court ruled evidence of the complainant's prior sexual 
encounter with the accused admissible because it was bound up with a prior 
inconsistent statement that shed light on her credibility."' In R v Darrach, the 
Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the constitutionality of section 
276, finding that it does not constitute an impermissible "blanket exclusion"."' 
The Court held that subsection 276(1) only prohibits admission of evidence to 
support "two specific, illegitimate inferences": the twin myths. 112  Prohibiting 
these "discriminatory generalizations"' 'I does not preclude the admission under 
subsection 276(2) of sexual history evidence to support non-discriminatory 
inferences, even on the issues of consent and credibility. These permissible, 
non-discriminatory inferences could include "evidence of sexual activity. 
proffered for its non-sexual features, such as to show a pattern of conduct or a 
prior inconsistent statement" h14 
The most troubling questions regarding the scope of the twin myths 
surround the use of evidence of prior sexual activity between the accused and 
the complainant. The previous version of section 276 struck down in Sea boyer 
applied only to evidence of the complainant's sexual activity with persons other 
than the accused. In laying out common law guidelines governing admissibility 
of sexual history in Sea boyer, McLachlin J wrote, "I question whether evidence 
of other sexual conduct with the accused should automatically be admissible 
in all cases; sometimes the value of such evidence might be little or none.""' 
When Parliament enacted the new section 276 shortly thereafter, it accepted 
the Court's invitation and made the rape shield provisions equally applicable 
109. See e.g. RJ Delisle, "Potential Charter Challenges to the New Rape Shield Law" (1992) 
13 CR (4th) 390. See also David M Paciocco, "The New Rape Shield Provisions in Section 276 
Should Survive Charter Challenge" (1993) 21 CR (4th) 223 [Paciocco, "New Rape Shield"]. 
110. [199512 SCR 912,141 NSR(2d) 101. 
111. Supra note 83 at para 32. 
112.Ibid. 
113. Ibid at para 34. 
114. Ibid at para 35. 
115.Supra note 4 at 633. 
to sexual activity with the accused and with others. This extension of the rape 
shield provisions has been controversial. Professor Stuart has consistently taken 
the position that "Canada's rape shield protection should not apply equally to 
prior sexual history with the accused."116 
Arguably, however, the time to question whether sexual activity with the 
accused should be covered by the rape shield provisions has passed. Justice 
McLachlin's observation that such evidence often has little or no value has 
proven true. For example, in R v JSS, the defence sought to lead evidence of 
numerous details of the prior sexual relationship between the accused and 
the complainant, including the use of sex toys and acts of intercourse during 
menstruation.' 7
 The trial judge excluded most of the evidence as irrelevant 
and inviting only the "discredited myths that a woman who enjoys sex must 
therefore have consented on these occasions, or is inherently less believable 
because of her supposedly loose morals"." As Professor Craig has pointed 
out, the effect of this evidence was to portray the complainant "as 'the type of 
woman' who would consent to anything"."' To the extent that it operates to 
exclude evidence tendered for such purposes, the extension of the rape shield 
provisions to cover sexual activity with the accused appears easily defensible. 
Since section 276 does apply to sexual activity with the accused, the 
challenge is to understand precisely the inferences the provisions prohibit. 
Clarity on this point has proven elusive, especially when it comes to inferences 
about consent where the evidence relates to other consensual sexual activity 
between the complainant and the accused.  121
 One reading of the provisions 
is that, regardless of the factual circumstances, the twin myths prohibition 
rules out any inference that the complainant's having consented to sexual 
activity with the accused on some other occasion makes it more likely that the 
complainant consented on the occasion in question.  121
 This broad reading of 
the twin myths is arguably available on the language of subsection 276(1), but 
it brushes close to the proposition rejected in Darrach that subsection 276(1) is 
a blanket exclusion of sexual history evidence going to consent. 122 
116. Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 21 at 281. 
117. 2014 BCSC 804 at para 9. 
118. Ibid at para 3 1. 
119. Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8 at 51. 
120. See Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 21 at 280. 
121. This broad reading of subsection 276(1) has been advanced, for example, by Professor 
Janine Benedet, who has argued that the inference "that consent to activity on a prior occasion 
makes it more likely on a subsequent occasion . . . is an impermissible inference that cannot be 
saved by resort to the balancing factors 
- this evidence is deemed inadmissible by the Code". 
See Benedet, "Barton", supra note 43 at 447. 
122. See  v Darrach, supra note 83 at para 32. 
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An alternative view holds that the twin myths categorically prohibited 
by subsection 276(1) are the bad character inferences that the complainant's 
sexual history makes her "the type to consent, or the type who should not be 
believed".123  Professor David Paciocco, now Justice of the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario, advanced this view of the twin myths soon after the adoption of the 
new section 276 in 1992, and Darrach has been read as an affirmation of this 
more limited reading of the section. 124  This understanding of the twin myths 
prohibition is grounded on a reading of subsection 276(1) that emphasizes 
the statutory limitation that the inferences prohibited are those that suggest 
that increased likelihood of consent or decreased credibility flow "by reason of 
the sexual nature of that activity" 125  This narrower view also maps on to the 
historical use of sexual history as a form of bad character evidence targeting 
women, which is the context in which twin myths reasoning was defined and 
rejected.'26 
Canadian courts remain divided over the scope of the twin myths prohibited 
by subsection 276(1).127  Ontario courts have often defined the twin myths 
narrowly. In R v Strickland, HeeneyJ admitted evidence of the existence of a prior 
sexual relationship between the accused and the complainant.  121  The evidence 
was relevant on the disputed issue of consent because it is "at least somewhat 
more probable that a complainant would consent to having sex with a man with 
whom she had an existing sexual relationship, than if no such relationship existed 
at all"  .121  The prior sexual relationship was admissible to show an increased 
likelihood that the complainant consented, Heeney J reasoned, but not in a 
manner prohibited by section 276.11  The jury would be misled if evidence 
of the ongoing sexual relationship were excluded, and admitting the evidence 
provided context to "dispel the inference of the unlikelihood of consent" that 
would arise from leaving the jury with the impression that the alleged sexual 
123. Paciocco, "New Rape Shield", supra note 109 at 226. 
124. See Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 21 at 278-79; RJ Delisle, "Adoption, Sub-silentio, 
of the Paciocco Solution to Rape Shield Laws" (2001) 36 CR (5th) 254. 
125. Paciocco, "New Rape Shield", supra note 109 at 233. 
126. See Seaboyer, supra note 4. The Court identified the "twin myths" as "the myths that 
unchaste women were more likely to consent to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of 
belief" (ibid at 604). 
127. See Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 21 at 280. 
128. (2007), 45 CR (6th) 183, 2007 CanLil 3679 (Ont Sup Ct). 
129. Ibidatpara28. 
130. See ibid at para 24. 
assault occurred between strangers or people with no prior relationship. 131
 This 
reasoning from Strickland has been followed in Ontario and elsewhere. 132 
An opposing view emerges from the Court of Appeal of Alberta. Recently 
in R v Goldfinch, that Court held that Strickland is not good law in Alberta."' 
Goldfinch involved an allegation of non-consensual sex between a male accused 
and a female complainant. The two had lived together for several months, after 
which the complainant ended the relationship. Subsequently, the two remained 
friendly and still saw each other, and occasionally they met for sex. The defence 
tendered evidence of the fact of the sexual relationship between the accused and 
the complainant that was ongoing at the time of the alleged offence
. 
The  Crown 
opposed admission of this evidence, and offered to concede by way of context 
"that the parties had had a prior relationship where they had lived together but 
that they had broken up and 'remained friends', that the complainant would 
come over to the respondent's place on occasion and would sleep over, and that 
the parties remained on good terms".  114
 Relying on Strickland, the trial judge 
admitted the evidence of the ongoing sexual relationship. The jury acquitted 
the accused and the Crown appealed. In setting aside the acquittal, the majority 
of the Court of Appeal of Alberta held that the only purpose for admitting the 
evidence was to support one of the twin myths: "namely that the complainant 
was more likely to have consented to sexual activity on the occasion in question 
because she had consented in the past"."' 
The Court of Appeal of Alberta took a similarly broad view of the twin myths 
prohibition in subsection 276(1) in R v Barton. 116
 In that complex, horrific and 
tragic case, the accused agreed to pay a woman for sex and then inflicted a fatal 
injury on her in the course of sexual activity.137
 The defence acknowledged 
131. Ibid at paras 34-35. This reasoning was relied upon by Berger  in dissent in R v Goldfinch. 
See 2018 ABCA 240. 
132. See  v Provo, 2018 ONCJ 474; R  WJA, 2010 YKTC 108 at para 34; R  Field, 2010 
YKSC 11 atparas 2, 4. 
133. R  Goldfinch, supra note 131 at para 3l. 
134. Ibidarpara7. 
135. Ibid at para 46. For commentary supportive of the majority analysis in Goldfinch, see 
Hamish Stewart, Sexual Offences in Canadian Law (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) (loose-
leaf updated 2018, release 32) at 8-16.1. 
136. Supra note 7. 
137. Barton was charged with first degree murder after Cindy Gladue died from an 11 cm 
perforation to her vaginal wall. The Crown's principal theory was that he intentionally cut 
her vaginal wall with a sharp object. The defence admitted that the accused inflicted the fatal 
injury in the course of sexual activity, but claimed that the injury was the accidental result 
of consensual digital penetration. The Crown's secondary theory was that even if the injury 
was caused by digital penetration of Gladue's vagina, the accused was guilty of manslaughter 
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that while the accused and the deceased, Cindy Gladue, agreed on a price in 
advance of the sexual activity; the accused did not actually pay Gladue for 
her sexual services on the night of her death. The Court of Appeal of Alberta 
determined that, in deciding whether the deceased consented to the accused's 
digital penetration of her vagina that night, it was irrelevant in law that he 
paid her the same agreed price for sex the night before and that similar sexual 
activity occurred.138  Understanding how the rape shield provisions apply on the 
facts of Barton is complicated by the fact that, at trial, those provisions were 
never applied; evidence of the previous sexual activity between the accused and 
the complainant was improperly admitted without objection from the Crown 
and without any application or analysis under section 276.139  The Court was 
Clear, however, in holding that subsection 276(1) made the evidence of the 
prior sexual interaction categorically irrelevant and inadmissible on the issue of 
consent.  140  The Court held that under subsection 276(1), "evidence of consent 
to sexual activity between a complainant and an accused on a prior occasion is 
I rrelevant to whether the complainant consented at the time in question."41 
This broad view of the twin myths prohibition may raise trial fairness 
concerns. Disputed factual issues including consent should generally be decided 
on the basis of all the evidence, including any circumstantial evidence, that has a 
legitimate logical bearing on those issues. Adjudicating the case in Goldfinch on 
the basis that the parties were "friends" when they were in fact regularly having 
sex arguably means deciding the case on a fictitious set of facts more favourable 
to the Crown than the actual circumstances. In Barton, there was clearly a danger 
that the jury might draw discriminatory inferences about Gladue's character as 
an Indigenous woman who was intoxicated and involved in sex work; those 
inferences would be impermissible on any reasonable understanding of the 
rape shield provisions. 112 But quite apart from those prejudicial bad character 
because he caused her death by the unlawful act of sexual assault. This theory put in issue 
whether Gladue consented to the accused's digital penetration of her vagina on the night of her 
death. See R v Barton, supra note 7. 
138. See ibid at paras 211-12. See also Benedet, "Barton", supra note 43 at 447. 
139. The trial judge's failure to apply section 276 to the admission of this evidence was one of 
the legal errors that necessitated a new trial. 
140. See  v Barton, supra note 7. See the section of the judgement entitled "Evidence of Prior 
Sexual Conduct Inadmissible Regarding Gladue's Consent" (ibid at paras 143-52). The Court 
explicitly left open the possibility that the evidence could be admissible to support a defence of 
mistaken belief in consent (ibid at para 149, n 67). 
141. Aid at Para 149 [emphasis in original]. 
142. See supra note 7. As the Court of Appeal of Alberta rightly pointed out, the potential for 
discriminatory reasoning about the propensity to consent and general worthiness of the deceased 
inferences, the evidence that the deceased agreed to sell her sexual services to the 
same man, in the same location, for the same price, on two consecutive nights 
could logically support an inference that she may, in her mind, have consented 
on the second night to the kind of digital penetration that occurred on the first 
night.  141
 This inference is arguably not prohibited by subsection 276(1) because 
it flows from the commercial nature of the parties' interactions and not, as 
required by subsection 276(1), "by reason of the sexual nature" of the prior 
sexual activity. 144
 In Barton there were also circumstantial factors favouring the 
Crown's position that there was no consent to the digital penetration on the 
second night, including the fact that the accused admitted to using more force 
on the second night and the level of violent force that would have been required 
to cause the fatal injury.  145
 However, the existence of circumstantial evidence 
favouring the Crown cannot justify dismissing circumstantial evidence that 
favours the defence as irrelevant. 
The exclusion under subsection 276(1) of the prior sexual history evidence 
in Goldfinch and Barton fits uneasily with the Supreme Court of Canada's 
conclusions that "s. 276(1) is an evidentiary rule that only excludes material that 
is not relevant" '146
 and that a total ban on twin myths reasoning is acceptable 
because such reasoning is inherently discriminatory and has "no place in a 
rational and just system of law". ' 47  One might, of course, understand these 
conclusions as a rule of constructive irrelevance, such that evidence is deemed 
irrelevant and discriminatory because it fits within the language of subsection 
276(1), broadly construed.  14' However, one of the main messages of Seaboyer is 
that the defence is generally entitled to rely on factually relevant evidence, and 
factual relevance cannot be negated by legislative or judicial fiat. I would argue 
that the Supreme Court of Canada's strong language in Seaboyer and Darrach 
about the discriminatory character and blanket irrelevance of twin myths 
reasoning should be understood to limit the kinds of inferences that merit 
being placed in that category. On this view, an interpretation of subsection 
and women like her was high (ibid at Para 128). It was incumbent on the trial judge to warn the 
jury against these discriminatory forms of reasoning (ibid at paras 161-62). 
143. See Don Stuart, "Barton: Sexual Assault Trials Must be Fair not Fixed" (2017) 38 CR 
(7th) 438 (noting that "on the issue of whether the complainant actually consented to sexual 
conduct including the violent listing on the second night it was surely relevant that she might 
have consented to listing the night before?" at 441). 
144. Criminal Code, supra note 5, s276(1). 
145. See supra note 7 at paras 144, 195. 
146. R v Darrach, supra note 83 at Para 37. 
147. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 630. 
148. This appears to be the effect of the reasoning in Barton, which distinguishes factual 
relevance from legal relevance and suggests that subsection 276(1) makes evidence legally 
irrelevant. See supra note 7 at Para 146. 
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276(1) that excludes evidence that is factually relevant for non-discriminatory 
inferential purposes is an interpretation of subsection 276(1) that is overbroad. 
It is well to remember that evidence of the complainant's sexual history that 
is not excluded under subsection 276(1) is not necessarily admissible. Rather, 
the admissibility of such evidence falls to be decided on the criteria outlined 
in subsection 276(2), including the balancing of probative value against 
prejudicial effect. Arguably, that balancing exercise is the central feature of the 
rape shield regime and most contested admissibility questions should be decided 
at that stage. Adopting a broad interpretation of twin myths reasoning under 
subsection 276(1) risks excluding relevant evidence without fully considering 
either its potential probative value or the extent of its prejudicial effect. 
In any event, Alberta law clearly takes a broad view of the twin myths that 
are prohibited absolutely by subsection 276(1), while Ontario courts have 
tended to take a narrower view. The language of the Criminal Code appears 
flexible enough to support either of these views. Both Barton and Goldfinch 
have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, so there is reason to hope 
that clarification on this point will be forthcoming. Whatever interpretation 
is ultimately adopted, clarity on the scope of the twin myths will improve the 
state of the law. 
(ii) Delayed Disclosure 
Like the complainant's sexual history, delayed reporting of sexual 
victimization was the subject of problematic assumptions at common law.'49 
The law upheld an expectation that a true victim would immediately report the 
offence to authorities."' Consequently, delays in reporting were understood to 
suggest a false allegation."' This assumption grounded the common law doctrine 
of recent complaint, which comprised two rules. First, despite the general rule 
against prior consistent statements and without the defence raising the issue of 
delay, the prosecution was entitled to lead evidence of any prompt report of a 
sexual offence to rebut the adverse inference that was thought to flow naturally 
from delayed reporting.  112  Second, when reporting was delayed, judges were 
149. For a detailed discussion, see Elaine Craig, "The Relevance of Delayed Disclosure to 
Complainant Credibility in Cases of Sexual Offence" (2011) 36:2 Queen's LJ 551 [Craig, 
"Delayed Disclosure"] 
150. See Kribs et ci v The Queen, [1960] SCR 400, 33 CR 57 [Kribs cited to SCR] 
("presumptions ... that she is expected to complain upon the first reasonable opportunity, and 
that if she fails to do so, her silence may naturally be taken as a virtual self-contradiction of 
her story" at 405). 
151. See ibid; Re Boyce (1975), 7 OR (2d) 561 at 577, 28 CR (NS) 336 (CA). 
152. See R vBoyce, supra note 151. 
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required to instruct juries that they could draw an adverse inference against the 
complainant. 113 
We now know that most sexual assault victims never report the experience 
to police, and that many others delay in reporting.  114  The common law 
premises that a complainant's immediate reporting was "normal" and "natural" 
and delayed reporting was "a virtual self-contradiction of her story"" are on 
their face invalid and discriminatory. Consequently, in 1983, the doctrine of 
recent complaint was expressly abrogated by an amendment to the Criminal 
Code.'56  This statutory reform clearly repudiated the myth that real victims 
report immediately, and it abrogated the two rules above: the prosecution can 
no longer lead evidence of a prompt report unless the defence raises the issue 
of delay, and juries must not be instructed that delayed reporting tells against 
the complainant's credibility.  117
 Beyond that, the effect of the amendment was 
unclear. The spare statutory language left open whether evidence of delayed 
reporting was admissible and what inferences could be drawn from it. 
The Supreme Court of Canada addressed issues of delay in R v DD, which 
involved a delayed disclosure of sexual abuse by a child complainant. ' 55  The trial 
judge admitted expert evidence from a child psychologist, who testified that 
delay said nothing either way about the truth of an allegation. By a majority, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the psychologist's evidence should have 
been excluded as unnecessary because the proposition he advanced could be 
communicated in a jury instruction. The majority suggested that that juries be 
instructed as follows: 
there is no inviolable rule on how people who are the victims 
of trauma like a sexual assault will behave. Some will make 
an immediate complaint, some will delay in disclosing the 
abuse, while some will never disclose the abuse. Reasons for 
delay are many and at least include embarrassment, fear, 
guilt, or a lack of understanding and knowledge. In assessing 
the credibility of a complainant, the timing of the complaint 
153. See ibid at 579. 
154. See Statistics Canada, supra note 73 at 17 (five per cent of sexual assaults reported 
to police in 2014); Craig, "Delayed Disclosure", supra note 149 at 557 (disincentives make 
delayed reporting likely). 
155. Kribs, supra note 150 at 405. 
156. See supra note 5. Section 275 provides that, in respect of sexual offence,, "[t]he  rules 
relating to evidence of recent complaint are hereby abrogated" (ibid, s275). 
157. See R v O'Connor (1995), 25 OR (3d) 19, 100 CCC (3d) 285 (CA) (Crown no longer 
permitted to bring evidence of recent complaint); Craig, "Delayed Disclosure", supra note 149 
at 559. 
158. 2000 SCC 43. 
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is simply one circumstance to consider in the factual mosaic 
of a particular case. A delay in disclosure, standing alone, will 
never give rise to an adverse inference against the credibility 
of the complainant."' 
Arguably, the message contained in this jury instruction differs subtly from the 
psychologist's testimony.'6' While the expert could be understood as suggesting 
that delay was irrelevant (because it said nothing either way about the truth of 
the allegation), the Supreme Court of Canada stopped short of indicating that 
delay is irrelevant to credibility. Instead, the majority held that delay means 
nothing "standing alone", but that it is "one circumstance to consider in the 
factual mosaic of a particular case"."' 
If delayed reporting remains a circumstance to be considered, what inferences 
from this evidence remain open after DD? The qualification that delay means 
nothing "standing alone" might be read as an invitation to view delay as a factor 
that weighs against credibility where unrelated factors pointing to a lack of 
credibility are also present.  112  However, Professor Craig has persuasively argued 
that DD should be interpreted as prohibiting entirely the inference that delay 
is generally damaging to credibility. "I On this view, rejecting the generalization 
that true victims disclose promptly means that delay can only be used to 
undermine credibility when there is something in the factual circumstances 
suggesting that the individual complainant would likely have made a prompt 
report. 114 
C. A Balancing Approach to Eliminating Myths 
Canadian law on sexual history evidence and delayed disclosure reveals 
a consistent approach to removing myths and stereotypes from the sexual 
assault adjudication. Since relevance is contextual and, subject to the rules 
of evidence, the Charter requires that the defence generally be permitted to 
lead relevant evjdence,'65  the Supreme Court of Canada has avoided sweeping 
159.Ibid at pata65. 
160. I am grateful to David Lepofsky for this insight. 
161.R v DD, supra note 158 at para 65. 
162. Craig, "Delayed Disclosure", supra note 149 at 565-68; R v HT, 2009 NLCA 69 at 
para 7. 
163. See Craig, "Delayed Disclosure", supra note 149 at 564. 
164. See ibid. 
165. For discussion of the law', inclusionary inclination in respect of relevant defence evidence 
and its relationship to the accused's fair trial rights under the Charter, see generally Seaboyer, 
supra note 4. For further discussion of Seaboyer, see also supra note, 22-25 and accompanying 
text. 
pronouncements about relevance and admissibility. Suggestions that sexual 
history evidence or delayed disclosure are always irrelevant or inadmissible, 
in general or in relation to particular issues like credibility or consent, have 
been rejected. Instead, the law prohibits stereotypical or discriminatory lines 
of reasoning flowing from these forms of evidence, but acknowledges that they 
may be relevant for other, legitimate inferential purposes. 
I would argue that Canadian courts should maintain this approach in 
addressing other myths and stereotypes about sexual assault. Broad conclusions 
that particular forms of evidence are irrelevant should be avoided. Instead, 
false premises and discriminatory lines of reasoning should be identified 
and explicitly prohibited. Identifying the impermissible lines of reasoning 
will permit judges to distinguish them from legitimate lines of reasoning. In 
short, myths and stereotypes about sexual assault are properly understood as 
prohibited inferences, and the tendency of some forms of evidence to invite 
these prohibited inferences is a form of prejudice.'66  That prejudice can lead to 
exclusion of the evidence, but it will not invariably do so if the evidence is also 
relevant for some other purpose. 
The exercise of weighing the permissible and impermissible uses of evidence 
is familiar in evidence law.  117  Evidence solely relevant to support a prohibited 
inference has no legitimate probative value and is inadmissible. Evidence that 
could support an impermissible inference but that also logically supports 
some legitimate line of reasoning is normally admissible subject to a limiting 
instruction."' Following Seaboyer, a trial judge will exercise discretion to 
exclude evidence where, despite any limiting instruction, its potential to be used 
for the prohibited purpose outweighs (or, for defence evidence, substantially 
outweighs) its legitimate probative value. 
Admittedly, the flexible approach to admissibility described here may not 
be as effective as bright-line rules in rooting out myths and stereotypes from 
sexual assault trials. For example, blanket exclusion of sexual history evidence 
or evidence of delayed complaint would undoubtedly do more to prevent 
improper uses of these forms of evidence. If the evidence could not be used at 
all, there would be no concerns about its being used to support discriminatory 
or stereotypical inferences. However, Canadian law has rejected such bright-line 
166. See Hami,h Stewart, "Marc Rosenberg and the Implied Fairness Guarantee" in Berger, 
Cunliffe & Stribopoulous, supra note 8, 13 (stating that "arguably [the] most important. 
type of prejudicial effect is the danger of admitting evidence which. . . tends to encourage the 
drawing of impermissible inferences" at 25). 
167. See e.g. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 609. 
168. See R v Corbett, supra note 18 ("best way to balance.., is to give the jury all the 
information, but at the same time give a clear direction as to the limited use they are to make 
of such information" at 691). 
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rules and embraced a flexible, context-sensitive approach to relevance and 
admissibility for good reasons. This approach remains the only way to ensure 
that the defence has access to relevant evidence for legitimate purposes. 161 
Examples where courts have successfully identified and rejected myths and 
stereotypes can be drawn from cases involving evidence about complainants' 
attire. Often, evidence of the complainant's manner of dress has no relevance at 
all outside the prohibited inferences that provocative attire impairs credibility 
or invites sexual activity. Thus, in R v Cain, the Court of Appeal of Alberta 
rejected a defence claim that the complainant's credibility was damaged because 
she allegedly wore a t-shirt with an image of a penis on it shortly after the 
alleged sexual assault. 171  The Court held that the complainant's "manner of 
dress was irrelevant to her credibility. By suggesting otherwise, defence counsel 
was relying on long-discredited myths and stereotypes about women deserving 
to be raped because they dress provocatively.""' 
Even where the complainant's manner of dress has some relevance for a 
legitimate purpose, courts can be careful to separate the permissible and 
impermissible purposes of the evidence. In Nyznik, for example, Molloy J 
addressed the complainant's attire in the reasons for judgment: 
There was nothing at all wrong with what [the complainant] 
was wearing that night. In cross-examination, defence counsel 
suggested to her that she wore a low-cut top in order to make 
herself attractive to all the men who would be present at the 
party. I found that suggestion to be offensive and irrelevant. 
What a woman wears is no indication of her willingness to 
have sexual intercourse, nor can it be seen as even the remotest 
justification for assuming she is consenting to sex. 171 
Nevertheless, Molloy J held that the complainant's attire was relevant for two 
legitimate purposes. Her willingness to stand outside in the freezing cold in 
light clothing was an indication of her strong interest in spending time with 
one of the accused, and her ability to walk in high-heeled boots shortly before 
the alleged sexual assault had probative value on her level of intoxication and 
capacity.  171  Nyznik was a judge-alone trial, but this approach to separating the 
169. Recall that in Seaboyer, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that blanket exclusion 
of sexual history evidence violated the accused's fair trial rights under the Charter because it 
could have the effect of excluding critical defence evidence that was relevant for legitimate, non-
discriminatory inferential purposes. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
170. Supra note 6. 
171.Ibidarpara30. 
172.Supra note 40 at para 188. 
173. See ibid. 
legitimate and prohibited uses of the evidence could also be followed in a jury 
trial. Juries can be instructed on the permissible and impermissible inferences 
from evidence and warned to avoid the latter. Moreover, defence evidence about 
the complainant's attire could be excluded if its potential to invite prohibited 
reasoning substantially outweighed its probative value for legitimate inferential 
purposes. 
Notice that this entire analysis depends on achieving a clear understanding 
of the lines of reasoning that are prohibited. Myths and stereotypes must 
be identified with precision. Absent a clear understanding of the prohibited 
inferences, judges will be unable to instruct juries (or themselves) to avoid 
them. 114
 They will also be ill equipped to meaningfully balance the probative 
value of evidence against its prejudicial effect. Clarity in identifying and 
articulating myths and stereotypes about sexual assault is therefore fundamental 
to the task of separating these prohibited lines of reasoning from legitimate 
inferences and making those distinctions meaningful in the adjudication of 
sexual assault cases. As we will see in the next part of this paper, this clarity has 
not always been achieved. 
f Subsequent Relationship wit 
-
 Accused 
Courts have struggled to define the permissible and impermissible uses of 
the complainant's after-the-fact conduct, and particularly the complainant's 
relationship with the accused after the alleged sexual assault. This issue arose in 
R v Ghomeshi, where the three complainants claimed that the accused suddenly 
and without consent subjected them to violent force in a sexual context while 
they were on dates.  171  All three complainants continued to socialize with the 
accused after the alleged assaults: each went on at least one further date with 
him, each sent him flirtatious correspondence inviting further contact, one had 
sexual contact with him, and another sent him flowers and an email less than 
a day after the alleged assault indicating a desire to have sex with him. The 
trial judge acquitted the accused on all counts, finding that the complainants 
174. See e.g. R v Barton, supra note 7. The trial judge appears to have overlooked the 
prejudicial effects that could flow from the facts that the deceased was an Indigenous woman 
who was intoxicated and engaged in sex work. The Court of Appeal of Alberta noted that, given 
the prevalence of discriminatory stereotypes about Indigenous women, "without a sufficient 
direction to the jury, the risk that this jury might simply have assumed that Barton's money 
bought [the deceased] Gladue's consent to whatever he wanted to do was very real, indeed 
inescapable" (ibid at para 128). The trial judge's failure to instruct the jury to avoid such 
stereotyping was an error of law. 
175. Supra note 3. 
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were not reliable witnesses primarily because they each misstated facts in 
testimony or police statements. In determining that the complainants were 
not credible and reliable witnesses, Horkins J also put some weight on the 
complainants' continued associations with the accused, which he found "out of 
harmony with the assaultive behaviour" alleged.176
 It is not clear whether this 
line of reasoning is open to a judge under Canadian law. 
Canadian courts have rejected as a myth the idea that real victims of sexual 
assault do not continue to associate with the perpetrator.  177  In R v CAM, the 
trial judge convicted the accused of sexual assault and related offences against 
his ex-wife.'7' On appeal, the defence argued that it was unusual "for rape 
victims to invite perpetrators back into the house and console them (which 
was the complainant's evidence)  11.171  Writing for the unanimous Manitoba 
Court of Appeal, Mainella JA rejected as "unsound" the defence argument the 
complainant's credibility was damaged because her actions "did not conform 
to some 'idealized standard of conduct"'."' This holding accords with the 
principle affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in DD that "there is no 
inviolable rule on how people who are the victims of trauma like a sexual assault 
will behave"."' These cases suggest that triers of fact fall into error when they 
rely on rigid, general expectations about how victims act in the aftermath of a 
sexual assault. 
In R v ARJD, the trial judge acquitted the accused of sexual offences against 
his step-daughter when she was between eleven and sixteen years of age.182  In 
acquitting the accused, the trial judge made comments that were scrutinized on 
appeal and are worth quoting in full: 
I do not discount the complainant's credibility because she 
delayed complaint or because she did not cry out or search 
out help from her mother or other family members. To judge 
her credibility against those myths of appropriate behaviour 
is not helpful. The supposed expected behaviour of the usual 
victim tells me nothing about this particular victim. 
176. Ibiclat paras 135-36. 
177. See R v Caesar, supra note 91 at para 6; Bernatchez cR, 2013 QCCA 700 at para 18. 
178. 2017MBCA70. 
179. Ibiclat para 47. 
180. Ibid at para 52. 
181. Supra note 158 at para 65. 
182. (23 February 2016), Edmonton 140876020Q1 (A1taQB), rev'd 2017ABCA 237 [ARID 
ABCA], rev'd 2018 SCC 6 [ARID SCC]. 
Having said all of that, however, given the length of time that 
these events occurred over, and the fact that the most serious 
event occurred months before [the complainant] complained, 
I would have expected some evidence of avoidance either 
conscious or unconscious. There was no such evidence. As a 
matter of logic and common sense, one would expect that 
a victim of sexual abuse would demonstrate behaviours 
consistent with that abuse or at least some change of behaviour 
such as avoiding the perpetrator. While I recognize that 
everyone does not react in the same way, the evidence suggests 
that despite these alleged events the relationship between the 
accused and the complainant was an otherwise normal parent/ 
child relationship. That incongruity is significant enough to 
leave me in doubt about these allegations. "I 
The trial judge thus acquitted solely on the basis of the lack of evidence that the 
complainant avoided the accused. 
The Court of Appeal of Alberta split over whether the trial judge's 
comments amounted to a legal error. The majority overturned the acquittal, 
finding that the trial judge relied on an impermissible stereotype when he 
judged the complainant's evidence against a general expectation that a sexual 
abuse victim would avoid the perpetrator. The majority held that "absence of 
avoidant behaviour or a change in behaviour as a generalization is logically 
irrelevant and as such, cannot form the basis of a credibility assessment leading 
to reasonable doubt—because we know that all sexual assault victims behave 
differently"."4  In dissent, Slatter JA concluded that the trial judge was not 
relying on a myth but drawing a permissible inference about the credibility of a 
particular complainant in a particular factual context."' An appeal by right to 
the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed, in brief reasons, 
substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of 
Appeal. In considering the lack of evidence of the complainant's 
avoidance of the appellant, the trial judge committed the very 
error he had earlier in his reasons instructed himself against: 
he judged the complainant's credibility based solely on the 
correspondence between her behaviour and the expected 
183. ARID ABCA, supra note 182 at para 82 [emphasis omitted] (quoting the trial judge's 
reason,). 
184. Aid at para 58, Paperny & SchutzJjA. 
185. See ibid at para 98, Slatter JA, dissenting. 
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behaviour of the stereotypical victim of sexual assault. This 
constituted an error of law."' 
ARID confirms that upholding rigid, generalized expectations about the 
behaviour of sexual assault victims constitutes impermissible stereotyping. That 
was a point of agreement for all the appellate judges.187  The conclusion that the 
trial judge engaged in such stereotyping also appears defensible on the facts, 
since the trial judge articulated a broad and questionable generalization about 
how "one would expect that a victim of sexual abuse" would behave.'88 
What seems less clear after ARJD is whether and when evidence of 
complainants' after-the-fact conduct is admissible and what legitimate inferences 
it can support. The majority in the Court of Appeal of Alberta used strong 
language in holding that a complainant's non-avoidance of the perpetrator says 
"nothing" about a sexual assault allegation and is "logically irrelevant"."' One 
might read these comments as suggesting that a complainant's after-the-fact 
conduct in relation to the accused is generally (or even always) irrelevant and 
inadmissible, or that no inferences favourable to the defence can be drawn 
from it. The latter suggestion is problematic because, as pointed out by Slatter 
JA in dissent at the Court of Appeal of Alberta, evidence of the complainant's 
avoidant behaviour is frequently admitted to support the Crown's case in sexual 
assault prosecutions.'90  It hardly seems consistent with the presumption of 
innocence to hold that a particular species of evidence can be admissible when 
it assists the Crown but inadmissible when it assists the defence.'9' 
Moreover, the idea that the complainant's after-the-fact conduct is 
inadmissible conflicts with the Supreme Court of Canada's usual approach 
to eliminating myths and stereotypes about sexual assault, as discussed in 
the previous section. That approach does not involve prejudging categories 
of evidence irrelevant. It would be more faithful to the Supreme Court of 
Canada's approach in other areas to acknowledge, like the dissent in ARID, that 
prohibiting rigid expectations about how sexual assault victims behave does 
186. ARJD SCC, supra note 182 at para 2. 
187. See ARID ABCA, supra note 182 (dissent disapproving "presumptions about how sexual 
assault victims, as a whole, should react" at para 97). 
188.Ibid at para 5. 
189.Aid at paras 39, 58. 
190. See ibid at para 96. 
191. See ibid (noting that "[i]f  actual behavioural changes of the complainant can be evidence 
of sexual assault, the absence of such behavioural changes must also be probative" at para 96, 
Slatter TA, dissenting). It is worth noting that Canadian courts have taken a broad view of 
the relevance of the after-the-fact conduct of accused in criminal cases generally. See e.g. R v 
Cameo, 2019 SCC 6 (where the accused's elaborate efforts to destroy his domestic partner's 
not preclude inferences from the complainant's after-the-fact conduct that are 
rooted in the specific factual context. 192 
The complainant's after-the-fact conduct was found to have legitimate 
probative value in R v LS.193
 In that case, the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
ruled admissible evidence that an ongoing sexual relationship between the 
accused and the complainant continued as if nothing had happened after an 
alleged sexual assault. Writing for the Court, Doherty JA concluded that the 
evidence was relevant to support the inference suggested by the defence that 
"the parties carried on as if nothing had happened because nothing had in fact 
happened" and the alleged sexual assault never occurred.' Justice Doherty 
acknowledged that people's reactions vary and that it would be wrong to 
conclude that the unchanged relationship "demonstrated that the assault did 
not occur".'95
 He observed, however, that relevance is a low standard that does 
not require the evidence to be determinative. LS thus suggests that, in some 
cases, the impermissible line of reasoning involves not just using the evidence 
but exaggerating its probative value. 
Canadian law rejects stereotyping about the expected behaviour of sexual 
assault victims: victims do not follow a standard script, and courts cannot 
reason as if they do. To this point, however, Canadian law remains somewhat 
uncertain about where to draw the line between impermissible stereotypes 
and legitimate inferences from complainants' after-the-fact conduct. The 
cases suggest that while impermissible inferences are based on generalized 
expectations of victims, legitimate inferences will be rooted in the particular 
facts of the case.'96
 Legitimate inferences are also likely to be modest: a claim 
that after-the-fact conduct is relevant may be defensible where a claim that 
it is determinative is not. Indeed, the idea the complainant's after-the-fact 
conduct is determinative—such that, for example, a woman who maintains 
a relationship with the accused cannot have been assaulted—constitutes a 
mythical line of reasoning that juries should be warned against, even if the 
evidence is understood as relevant. Given these complexities, evidence of the 
body were determined to be relevant both to whether her death was an accident or homicide 
and to whether the homicide was manslaughter or murder). 
192. See ARID ABCA, supra note 182 (noting that "[p]ost-event behaviour is relevant and 
probative, even if all complainants do not react the same way" at para 98). 
193. 20170NCA685. 
194. Aid arpara 88. 
195. Ibid at para 89. 
196. This suggestion accords with the principle that findings of fact must be based on case-
specific evidence and not generalizations, which the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in R 
vS(RD). See [1997] 3 SCR 484, 151 DLR (4th) 193. 
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complainant's relationship with the accused after the alleged assault remains 
a challenging issue for Canadian courts. The analysis would be advanced by a 
clearer authoritative statement of the inferences that are prohibited. 
[Stsiitsi rrrin 
Eliminating myths and stereotypes from the adjudication of sexual assault 
cases is and should be a high priority for Canadian courts. Misguided beliefs 
about sexual assault skew the fact finding process, and reliance on those beliefs 
by judges and lawyers is one reason many experience and perceive courtrooms 
as a hostile environment for sexual assault complainants.197  Enhanced social 
awareness of the pervasiveness of sexual violence and the impunity many 
perpetrators enjoy, coupled with compelling critiques of the Canadian legal 
response to that violence,"' have undermined confidence in the criminal justice 
system more broadly. In this climate courts must make every effort to ensure 
that the sexual assault cases that come before them are adjudicated without 
resort to misconceptions and discriminatory lines of reasoning. 
Criminal courts also carry the heavy responsibility of ensuring that 
every accused person has a fair trial. Subject to the rules of evidence and the 
prohibition of particular inferences, this requires that the defence generally 
be permitted to bring forward all evidence that is logically relevant to the 
material issues. Repudiating myths and stereotypes means rejecting certain 
discriminatory lines of reasoning, but it does not make whole categories of 
evidence irrelevant or inadmissible. Indeed, sweeping prohibitions that would 
rule out any consideration of particular forms of evidence are avoided as 
inconsistent with the accused's right to make full answer and defence and with 
our overall approach to finding facts. Outside the prohibited lines of reasoning 
identified as myths, relevance remains an elastic concept that leaves a wide 
scope for reasoning from logic and human experience.'99 
Distinguishing myths and stereotypes from legitimate lines of reasoning 
continues to be a challenge for Canadian courts. Judges cannot be expected 
to manage this task well and consistently unless the prohibited inferences are 
identified with clarity. As we have seen, there are areas in Canadian law—
including the twin myths prohibited under subsection 276(1) and the use of 
evidence of the complainant's after-the-fact conduct—where this precision 
remains elusive. One hopes that appellate courts will provide leadership in 
bringing clarity to this important area of evidence law. 
197. See Elaine Craig, "The Inhospitable Court" (2016) 66:2 UTLJ 197. 
198. See e.g. Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8. 
199. As the Court of Appeal of Alberta recently put it: 
[A] stereotypical myth about sexual assault complainants is a form of 
prohibited reasoning and cannot be relied upon by triers of fact. However, 
triers of fact are entitled, indeed are required, to rely on common sense 
and human experience in assessing evidence and the credibility of witnesses, 
including reasonable assumptions about how ordinary people can be 
expected to act. 
Re PFJ, 2018 ABCA 322 at para 14. 
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